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Patterson v. Texas
123 S. Ct. 24 (2002)
L ItXkdw
In 1995, Toronto M. Patterson ("Patterson") was convicted and sentenced
to death for killing his cousin and her two daughters. At the time the crime was
committed, Patterson was seventeen years old and did not have a prior criminal
record or a history of violence After his appeals were denied, Patterson asked
the United States Supreme Court to stay the execution of his death sentence.
The Court denied Patterson's application for a stayof execution and it denied his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.'
II. A nljs
The majority of the Court did not offer an explanation of its refusal to stay
Patterson's execution.4 However, the Court's refusal was grounded in its deci-
sion in Star#Wv Km zy.s Starfadheld that the state could prescribe the death
penalty for juveniles who were sixteen or seventeen at the time they committed
a capital murder.' The Court reasoned that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against the imposition of cruel or unusual punishment must be judged by the
standards of decencyheld bymodem American society. The Court determined
that the consensus among the states that use the death penalty was that capital
punishment was an acceptable penalty for juvenile offenders.8
Justice Stevens dissented in Paumsn; it is his opinion that the consensus
among the states and the international cornmmuity has shifted since the Court
decided Swofai 9 Stevens urged the Court to reconsider its decision on capital
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sentences that are imposed on juveniles as soon as possible.'0 Therefore, he
recommended that the Court stayPatterson's execution until it could take up the
issue."
Justice Ginsburg, joined by justice Breyer, agreed with Justice Stevens and
concluded that the issue of capital punishment for juveniles must be revisited. 2
Ginsburg's dissent was based on the Court's decision in A tkim v Vigir a, in
which the Court held that the execution of a mentally retarded defendant is
prohibited bythe Eighth Amendment."' The Court inA tkim concluded that the
appropriate punishment for a crime must be proportional to the culpabilityof the
offender."5 The Court found that the personal culpability of mentally retarded
defendants is often diminished by their deficient comprehension abilities. 6
Modem research reveals that many of the comprehension deficiencies prevalent
in juveniles parallel the deficiencies of the mentally retarded. 17 Ginsburg argued
that the holding of A tkim created a reasonable argument for a reconsideration
of Starfod and joined Justice Stevens's assertion that Patterson's execution
should be stayed until a reconsideration could take place. I"
III. Cai~ion
Shifting international and domestic norms are marginalizing the execution
of capital defendants who committed their crimes before the age of eighteen.
The Pattmron dissents indicate that the Court is likely to revisit the execution of
juvenile defendants in light of A tkir. The diminished ability fully to compre-
hend the death penaltyexhibited in mentally retarded defendants is analogous to
the formative comprehension of juvenile defendants. In light of these similari-
ties, Ginsburg's opinion that A tkim creates a reasonable argument for the
reconsideration of Star#/mshould compel the Court to reconsider its position on
the execution of juvenile offenders. 9
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